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I. INTRODUCTION

The advent of third-party litigation finance introduces a new
gatekeeper to the legal process. Before deciding to lend money to a
plaintiff, a litigation finance company will conduct at least some
review and make an assessment of the quality of the case.' Since

*
Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A.,
Amherst College.
** Principal Research Scientist, CNA. Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., Princeton
University.
1. See generally Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and
Australia: How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687, 687-88
(2011) (providing an overview of how litigation finance works).
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litigation finance loans are generally nonrecourse, 2 a litigation finance
company is likely to refuse to loan money to plaintiffs with the
weakest cases. Such voluntary claim screening may improve social
welfare by reducing the incidence of frivolous claims. But the volume
of frivolous claims may still be higher than it would be in a world
without third-party litigation finance. In particular, third-party
litigation finance companies, which lend money to litigants to enable
them to pursue cases, might sometimes finance claims that would
have a very low probability of prevailing at trial on the assumption
that such claims may encourage nuisance settlements. 3 This danger
may be greater than when a plaintiff self-finances, because the
provision of outside financing may help make credible a threat to
proceed to trial in the absence of a settlement.4 This possibility makes
the social welfare consequences of alternative litigation finance an
empirical question. Surely, many financed claims will be meritorious,
in the probabilistic sense that if the plaintiffs were to receive
financing, they would be more likely than not to win at trial. It is
uncertain, however, whether the beneficial economic effects of
enabling such claims outweigh the negative effects of facilitating
claims that courts are highly likely to reject. The answer may vary
based on the type of claim or the type of litigation finance
arrangement.

2.
See Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn't Gold: Analyzing the Costs and
Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 708-09 n.8 (2007) (quoting litigation finance
contracts provisions guaranteeing that loans are nonrecourse, meaning that they are not secured
by other assets).
3.
See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the
Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 613, 627-29 (2012) (discussing how rational,
self-interested financiers would invest in a frivolous lawsuit because there is a "chance that a
claim will slip through" and lead to a settlement offer); Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott
Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-PartyLitigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice
System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 645, 662-65 (2012) (explaining how an increase in the supply of
third-party financing may contribute to increases in speculative litigation on the margin). But see
Mariel Rodak, Comment, It's About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance
Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 518-19 (2006) (providing a rebuttal
to assertions that the litigation finance industry promotes frivolous litigation). In a nascent
litigation finance industry, it is unlikely that many cases will be frivolous because the earliest
recipients of funding are likely to be those with the strongest cases. But as the industry grows,
the danger will become more serious.
4.
A provision of outside funding can be a mechanism by which a plaintiff "ties its hands."
See generally Bruce L. Hay, ProceduralJustice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803,
1811 (1997) (describing how litigants might face conflict between their ex ante and ex post
preferences). If the defendant knows that the plaintiff does not care about the cost of trial, then it
may offer more advantageous settlement offers. Thus, the litigation finance company may agree
to contracts generously assuring plaintiffs continued funding because the company and the
plaintiff share in the benefits of the increased credibility.
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Although unregulated third-party financing might lead to more
nuisance claims, a regulated system could be structured to block the
financing of many nuisance claims without also blocking stronger
claims. The legal system might use accumulated empirical evidence to
make case-by-case estimates of case quality and bar financing in cases
in which the measure of case quality is below some predetermined
threshold. These case-by-case estimates would depend on the area of
law, the specific attributes of the claim, and the terms of the proposed
litigation financing arrangement, with higher interest rates signaling
a relatively weak claim. If detailed regression data were available, a
statistical formula could be devised that would assign a preliminary
estimate of the probability that the claim would prevail. Under this
system, the law would provide that claims below a certain probability
threshold could proceed only in the absence of litigation financing.
Even absent a sufficient amount of data to conduct regression
studies, one could devise legal rules that take advantage of the finance
company's expertise in separating relatively strong claims from
relatively weak ones. For example, the law could allow litigation
financing, but only if the finance company and the defendant agree
that the loser will pay the winner's costs. 5 Then, the litigation finance
company would be on the hook for the other side's fees if it loses at
trial; however, if its client prevails, then the finance company would
be refunded whatever money it spent on the litigation, plus interest
payments from its client. A litigation finance company would only
agree to such a regime if it is sufficiently confident in its client's
claims. The demonstration of a company's faith in the merits of its
client's claims, combined with the tendency of fee-shifting rules to
increase the cost of litigation,6 might lead many defendants to decline
the loser-pays option. Regardless, the mere possibility of such fee
shifting might help separate strong and weak claims. A weaker
version of this rule would require the loser to pay only some fraction of
the winner's costs; a stronger version would require the loser to pay a
multiple of the winner's costs. 7 The degree of claim screening will
5.
In general, parties do not opt into or out of fee-shifting rules. See John J. Donohue III,
Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who
Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1093-95 (1991) (discussing the differences between the British
rule and American rule for fee shifting). A legal rule explicitly requiring a party to offer to opt
into the British rule would, however, likely change this since the other party would not believe
that the offering party was suggesting the British rule for personal advantage.
6.
See, e.g., Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really
Cheaper?, 3 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 143, 144 (1987) (suggesting that a change to the English rule
would increase the amount expended per lawsuit).
7.
The fee-shifting literature has recognized that even if it is desirable that the losing
party make a payment to the winning party, the optimal amount of money that the losing party
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increase as the fraction or multiple increases.8 Fee shifting thus
provides a flexible mechanism that can be adjusted based on the
amount of gatekeeping desired.
We suggest that the legal system allow some claims to proceed
and bar others based on signals of litigation quality gleaned from
third-party assessments. This proposal may seem radical. These thirdparty assessments are based on information about the quality of the
claim that is preliminary and extrajudicial. Thus, the legal system
would be allowing some claims to proceed and barring others based on
a very noisy signal of claim quality, rather than on some form of
adjudication. In this article, we take on the objection that the legal
system should not use proxies in this manner. We argue that
whenever the legal system has some signal of the quality of a
plaintiffs case, even if the signal is a noisy one, there is some
estimated level below which the legal system should block the claim
through a procedure akin to summary judgment. We also show that
there is some level above which the legal system should block a
defense of this claim. Our arguments apply to all signals of claim
quality, not just the signals that arise from litigation finance. But the
argument is particularly relevant in the context of litigation finance
for two reasons: First, litigation finance necessarily introduces a
gatekeeper into the litigation process. Second, because restrictions on
litigation finance already exist, rules limiting litigation finance-for
example, the aforementioned rule requiring a fee-shifting
arrangement-seem unlikely to offend due process. Other potential
applications of our argument would be much more likely to encounter
due process objections, especially in the United States.
Our approach of using a gatekeeper to discourage frivolous
claims differs in a significant way from the existing economic
literature. Authors who propose mechanisms to discourage
unmeritorious suits (and unmeritorious defenses of suits) have

should pay to the winning party might differ from the amount of legal fees. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of
Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs, 27 RAND J. EcoN. 269, 277 (1996) (noting that neither "the
implicit award nor the implicit penalty under the British rule necessarily corresponds closely to
the optimal award and penalty").
8.
If the litigation firance company were certain of winning should the case go to trial,
then it would be guaranteed to receive its reasonable fees, and it would accept a case at an
interest rate sufficient only to compensate it for the discounted value of its time. At lower levels
of confidence, whether the litigation finance company would take a case would depend on the
interest rate on the probability that the defendant would agree to fee shifting and on the
magnitude of fee shifting. It is beyond the scope of this Article to calculate the optimal fraction or
multiple. The point is that at any given fraction or multiple, a litigation finance company would
provide a signal of its confidence in the litigation.
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generally focused on imposing penalties after suits are resolved. For
example, under Polinsky and Rubinfeld's model, 9 courts would
determine whether to impose sanctions for a frivolous suit only after
the underlying proceeding has concluded. Similarly, the British Rule
for attorneys' fees is often called the "loser pays" rule because any fee
shifting depends on the outcome of the lawsuit.' 0 An exception in the
literature is the "sincerity rule" proposed by David Anderson." Under
this rule, a party may give the other a take-it-or-leave-it settlement
offer, and if the other side declines, the offeror must pay the other
party's trial costs. Because settlement will be completely prohibited
later, the offeree will accept the offer if it is greater than what the
offeree expects to receive at trial. Even this mechanism, however, does
not take into account any information from third-party assessments
about the strength of the suit.
This Article proposes screening legal claims based on ex ante
assessments of lawsuit quality. Under claim screening, if an ex ante
signal indicates that a plaintiffs probability of success is sufficiently
low, the plaintiff will not be permitted to bring the claim. We label this
"pro-defendant screening," but we also consider "pro-plaintiff
screening." Under pro-plaintiff screening, if the ex ante signal
indicates that a plaintiffs probability of success is sufficiently high,
the defendant is not permitted to defend the claim.
This proposal does not depend on trial costs; however, as we
will show, the case for it is strengthened when litigation is expensive.
Rather, the argument is based on a core trade-off. On one hand,
reliance on a noisy signal sacrifices potentially better information that
may develop at trial. On the other hand, trials are generally one-shot
affairs. It is not feasible to repeat a trial many times, with different
judges and juries; thus, a trial reveals only what a particularjudge
and jury decided, not what most would decide. When a signal suggests
that the plaintiffs estimated probability of victory is very small, the
danger that the signal is inaccurate may be less than the danger that
a single trial will result in an idiosyncratic outcome. Even if trials
9.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An
Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 404 (1993) (describing the frivolous-suit model).
10. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit and Settlement vs. Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 55 (1982) (describing
the British system whereby the losing side bears all costs). Even Professors Bebchuck and
Chang's innovative formulation would shift fees only when the margin of victory is sufficiently
large, fee shifting depends on the trial outcome. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang,
An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious
Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 396 (1996).
11. David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225, 240-41 (1994) (defining the "sincerity rule').
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were costless, automatic resolution of the lawsuit would be preferable
to a one-shot trial if the signals were sufficiently extreme. When the
signal value is closer to the center of the probability continuum,
however, a trial is preferable.
A claim-screening device can also be valuable when it causes
litigation to be settled preemptively. In the absence of pro-defendant
claim screening, for example, plaintiffs might sometimes bring suits
with a low probability of victory, either because damages are
sufficiently high to make the suits valuable, or because the
expectation of extracting a settlement makes the suits worthwhile
despite their negative expected value. 12 A claim-screening device
would reduce plaintiffs' incentives to bring and maintain such suits or
encourage plaintiffs to settle such suits for even smaller amounts. A
defendant ordinarily might be willing to pay $5 million to settle a
claim from a plaintiff who has a 5% chance of winning $100 million,
but perhaps not if the claim-screening mechanism will prevent the
claim from going to trial anyway. Thus, claim screening may be
desirable even if it affects only those cases that would most likely
settle anyway. 13

Our results reinforce the value of forcing or encouraging all-ornothing rather than compromise resolutions to lawsuits. David Kaye
defended the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard on similar
grounds against an alternative that would allow damages based on
the probability of victory.14 If the probability that a defendant will be
found liable is 0.75, then the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
would provide 100% damages while a probabilistic approach would
provide 75% damages. The question is thus whether it is efficient to
grant the additional 25% in damages, and Kaye's point is that there is
a 0.75 probability that these additional damages are justified. Kaye
12. For an assessment of why plaintiffs might bring negative-expected-value suits, see
Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 537-42 (1997).
13. Low-probability cases are particularly likely to settle when the actual probability of a
plaintiffs success is near an end of the probability continuum because it is less likely that the
estimates of the probability of victory will be sufficiently asymmetric to justify going to trial.
Donohue, for example, conjectures that suits will generally go to trial only if the plaintiffs and
defendant's estimates of the probability of victory differ by more than 0.50. See John J. Donohue
III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs,
Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 204-05 (1991) (detailing the
significance of the 0.5 value). This is more likely if the actual probability is in the middle of the
probability spectrum than if the actual probability is near the ends, for example 0.05 or 0.95. See
id.
14. See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard: Justifiably
Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 502
(analogizing the rule to maximum likelihood, which "makes a few expensive mistakes, but it does
not err at all in most cases").
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concludes that the optimal damages function is discontinuous, with no
damages for a perceived probability of liability below 0.5 and full
damages for everything else. Although Kaye focused on damage
awards at trial, the same logic applies to settlements in the shadow of
a trial. Indeed, assuming that the vast majority of cases settle, Kaye's
system will accomplish little. If the probability that a defendant will
be found liable approximates the probability that a defendant should
be found liable, then settlement amounts will resemble the outcomes
that would occur in a proportional damages regime. For example, if
60% of courts would find a defendant liable and there is roughly a 60%
chance that the defendant should be found liable, then Kaye would
recommend 100% damages, but settlement would likely result in
compromise. Claim screening provides an antidote, pushing in the
direction of all-or-nothing results. In the analysis that follows, claim
screening applies to suits at the time of filing or shortly thereafter. Of
course, if universal claim screening were thought too expensive, it
could be applied shortly before trial. Then, as long as claim screening
is sufficiently cheaper than trial, overall costs will likely be reduced.
The anticipation of such claim screening would still deter some
frivolous suits and defenses, though we expect that the benefits of
claim screening would be reduced as well.
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part II.A, we offer a
simple mathematical model. Initially, the analysis assumes that the
number of truly liable and truly not liable cases are equal, and that
false positives are as costly as false negatives. Under this assumption
(among others), there exists some threshold signal value below which
social welfare will be raised by barring plaintiffs' suits, and some other
threshold above which social welfare will be raised by automatically
resolving the liability issue in favor of the plaintiff. Even if this
assumption is relaxed, one-sided claim screening will still be useful.
We show in Part II.B that our conclusions are only strengthened once
trial costs are factored in. The higher the trial costs, the closer the
optimal thresholds for claim screening will be to the middle of the
probability distribution.
To obtain a better appreciation for plausible values of these
thresholds given different signal strengths and to incorporate the
dynamics of settlement into our analysis, we offer a simulation model
in Part III. The simulation suggests that, under plausible
assumptions, the optimal thresholds for claim screening are
surprisingly close to 0.50. We show that this result is robust to a
variety of changes in assumptions. For example, the 0.50 threshold is
optimal whether the third-party signal is strong or quite weak,
whether the parties are relatively good or bad at estimating the
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strength of the claim, and whether one party has better information
than another. Lowering or raising the parties' trial costs, even if that
creates asymmetric trial costs, does not alter this conclusion. The most
important question may be how costly the signal is to obtain; however,
claim screening may well be economical as long as it is cheaper than
the trials that it will sometimes replace. When the plaintiff opts for
litigation financing, the finance companies will perform a gatekeeping
function anyway, and screening should not pose a significant
additional cost.
We believe that these results will tend to understate the value
of claim screening for two reasons. First, we suspect that there are
many more low-probability claims than claims near the middle of the
probability distribution. It is easier to develop legal theories that have
only a small chance of prevailing than to develop successful legal
theories. Lawyers should prefer strong cases to weak ones, all else
being equal, but the existing legal system may encourage the filing of
low-probability "strike suits" with high damage claims in the hope of
settlement. Empirical evidence supports the notion that such suits
(e.g., derivative actions) usually fail when tried.15 Second, our results
use a fixed pool of cases. But if our approach increases litigation
accuracy, then parties may improve their behavior in response,
reducing the probability of litigation and changing the pool of cases.
For example, defendants may be more likely to take efficient
precautions if legal accuracy increases. 16 We do not explicitly model
this. Our approach is general across litigation and not limited to the
context of torts; we do not wish to limit the analysis by focusing only
on areas of law in which the court assesses whether the defendant has
taken sufficient precautions.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL

Consider a set of cases where the correct finding is either
liability or no liability. Suppose for any given case that we do not
observe the correct finding ex ante but receive a signal of the
proportion of judges who would assign liability. If judges are more
likely to be right than wrong over the set of all cases, we should
employ claim screening rather than traditional adjudication in cases
with a sufficiently strong signal. To appreciate this intuition, consider

15. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 60 (1991) (finding that shareholder plaintiffs have "abysmal success in court").
16. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determinationof Liability, 37 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 2-3 (1994) (describing how higher levels of accuracy will increase deterrence).
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two extreme possibilities: a perfect signal and a signal containing no
information at all. With the perfect signal, adjudication is worthless
because the signal reveals the majority of judges' decisions and,
consequently, the true merit of the case (under our assumptions of
aggregate judicial accuracy). For example, suppose a signal indicates
with certainty that 75% of judges would impose liability after hearing
all the evidence. This implies that the correct decision is to impose
liability, and relying on this perfect signal to find automatic liability
would lead to the correct resolution. Adjudication would introduce an
unnecessary 25% risk of an incorrect resolution. On the other hand, a
signal containing no information at all (such as a coin flip) is
worthless. Relying on it would produce only a 50% chance of arriving
at the correct answer. Since judges are right more than they are
wrong, adjudication can do better than this.

A. An Illustration
Figure 1 provides an illustration of claim screening's potential
benefits and costs for defendants, reflecting the intuition and
structure of our formal model. Figure 1 illustrates a particular set of
cases. In each case, the correct finding is either "liability" (denoted r)
or "no liability" (denoted NL ). However, since judges estimate L and
NL with error, we use L and NL to denote the actual resolution of the
cases.
FN Isz (s)
denotes
an arbitrarily
defined
cumulative
distribution function ("CDF") of signal values s for cases in which the
correct finding is not liability. Thus, FNL IN (s) is the proportion of
truly not liable cases that would automatically (and correctly) be
dismissed under a claim screening mechanism if the threshold for
automatic dismissal were set at s. Similarly, FN I,-(s) denotes a CDF of
signal values for false-negative cases, truly liable cases that would
automatically be dismissed under a claim-screening mechanism given
a threshold of s. Thus, it represents the proportion of false negatives.
In this illustration, FNLIRL(s) is strictly above FNLlIr(s). This reflects

the intuition that, even if the signal is somewhat noisy, truly not liable
cases are more likely to produce low signals than truly liable cases.
The curves meet at 0 and 1 because, if the thresholds were set at these
extremes, either none or all of the cases-both the truly not liable and
truly liable cases-would be dismissed automatically.
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Figure 1: Pro-Defendant Claim Screening
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To measure the benefits and costs of claim screening for the
hypothetical set of cases in the illustration, we must consider how
these cases would be resolved in the status quo absent claim
screening. We use PLIE to represent the probability that liability
would be found in a truly liable case, and PL IsL represents the
probability that liability would be found in a truly not liable case. In
the illustration, PLiE > PLINL and are invariant to s (for simplicity).

The dashed lines represent the respective CDFs multiplied by the
corresponding trial outcome. Thus, FNL IL (s)pL Is

represents the

proportion of truly not liable cases that would automatically (and
correctly) be dismissed under a claim-screening mechanism if the
threshold for automatic dismissal were set at s but that would have
resulted in an incorrect finding of liability in the absence of claim
screening. Similarly, FNL It(s)pLIr represents the proportion of truly

liable cases that would automatically (and incorrectly) be dismissed
under a claim-screening mechanism if the threshold for automatic
dismissal were set at s and that would have correctly resulted in a
finding of liability in the absence of claim screening.
These curves thus represent the benefit and the cost of claim
screening, respectively. The benefit of claim screening is that it
reduces the number of false liability findings. Accordingly, FNL Ir
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(s)pL IN signifies the cases resolved correctly under 'claim screening
but incorrectly under the status quo. The cost of claim screening is
that it reduces the number of correct liability findings. FNLlr(s)pLfI
captures this cost by showing the cases resolved incorrectly under
claim screening but correctly under the status quo. The heights of the
curves illustrate the benefits and costs for particular signal thresholds
for pro-defendant claim screening. That threshold is set at 0.30 (which
is where the slopes of the dotted lines are equal and thus the optimal
value for the set of cases illustrated in Figure 1). The amount FNL IaL
(s)pLINL represents the benefits of pro-defendant claim screening
(reduced false positives). The amount FNLIr(S)pLIr represents the costs
of pro-defendant claim screening (increased false negatives). The
difference between the heights of these two curves represents the net
benefit of pro-defendant claim screening, and the optimal threshold
occurs where this net benefit is maximized.
Figure 2 extends Figure 1 to illustrate the potential benefits of
pro-plaintiff claim screening for the same set of cases, where the
plaintiff automatically wins if a signal exceeds a particular value. We
define FL Ir (s) = 1 - FNL IE (s), and we define FL In (s) = 1 - FNL I n (s).

Thus, FL lE(s) represents the proportion of the truly liable cases that
would result in an automatic liability determination if the threshold
for pro-plaintiff screening were set at s, and FLrn (s) represents the
corresponding proportion of the truly not liable cases. We then define
PNL|E = 1 - PLIL and pNLIsL = 1 -pnISt. Note that FLIr(s) is above
FLIRL(s) because the truly liable cases will generally produce higher
signal values.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
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Figure 2: Pro-Defendant and Pro-Plaintiff Claim Screening
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The dotted lines represent the benefit and cost of pro-plaintiff
claim screening. FLjt(s) pNLIE represents the truly liable cases that
will be resolved automatically (and correctly) for the plaintiff under
pro-plaintiff screening but would have been resolved incorrectly in
court, and FLINL(s)pNLjRL represents the truly not liable cases that

will be resolved automatically (and incorrectly) for the plaintiff but
would have been resolved correctly in court. The heights of the red
dotted lines thus represent the benefit (reduced false negatives) and
the cost (increased false positives) of pro-plaintiff claim screening with
this threshold. The difference between the two pro-plaintiff dotted
lines represents the net benefit of pro-plaintiff claim screening. The
optimal signal threshold here is set at 0.52.
This graphical analysis, of course, does not prove that claim
screening will always be optimal. The particular CDFs and
probabilities are, after all, arbitrarily chosen. Indeed, even with these
curves, a conclusion that claim screening produces net benefits reflects
two premises: first, that the number of truly liable and truly not liable
cases are equal, and second, that the costs of false positives and false
negatives are equal. We will return to these assumptions in our formal
analysis. The graph, nonetheless, usefully illustrates two intuitions:
First, when even a noisy signal is sufficiently near the extremes of the
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probability distribution, the chance that the signal is misleading is
relatively low, and the danger that claim screening will lead to bad
results is relatively low as well. The second is that the optimal claim
screening thresholds need not be symmetric and will depend on the
shape of the CDFs.
B. A Model Without Trial Costs
As above, consider a set of cases in which the correct finding is
either "liability" (denoted L) or "no liability" (denoted 191). For either
type of case, the court system may find liability with one of two
probability values: PL Itow and PL Ihi, where PL I tow <PL I hi. The probability
p e [pLII.o, PLI]hi may be thought of as the proportion of judges who

would impose liability. (In the simulations of Part III, we allow for a

and
Let pNL Ilow = 1 - p Itow
probabilities.)
of
distribution
truly
of
PNLIhi = 1 - PLIhi. Let 2hiow ir e [0,1] represent the proportion

liable cases that have a probability of a liability finding at court of

The remaining share Ahi I = (1 - 14ow Ir) of truly liable cases has
a probability of a liability finding PLIhi in each case. Let Ahow I1 E [0,1]
be the share of truly not liable cases that have a PL Ilow probability of a
liability finding at court. This means a share AhiIN L= (1 - AiowIivn) will

PL Ilow.

have a probability PLIhi of a liability finding. This notation is
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Proportion of Cases with Each Probability of Liability
Finding Within Truly Liable and Truly Not Liable Cases
Court's probability of finding liability

PLI1ow

Correct

Truly liable

oAhilt

PLIhi

= (1 -

)

outcome type

Truly not liable

howlz

Ahilst = (1 -

olSt)

The only assumption we make about the accuracy of the court
is that truly not liable cases have the lower probability of liability at
court than truly liable cases. Specifically, we assume hlowINL Alowl.Note that these assumptions are fairly general. They accommodate
both a perfect court (i.e., AhowI n = 1, Ahowl = 0, PLIlow= 0, PLIhi= 1), as

1654

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:6:1641

well as a completely uninformed court in which the probability of a
liability finding bears no relation to the correct finding (i.e., hiow.IL
AlowIE, PLIlow=PLhi).

As a baseline we first define the total expected social costs of
court errors in the status quo. Let a represent the share of cases that
are truly liable. Let the cost for a false no-liability finding equal cNL I[.
Because pNLlow and pNLIhi are the proportions of judges who would find
no liability for the groups of cases with a low and high probability of
finding liability, respectively, the expected error cost from false noliability findings is QCNL IE (Alow IEPNL Ilow + Ah IE PNL Ihi). Assume a cost of
cL IA per case that imposes false liability. The expected error cost from
false-liability findings in the status quo is (1 - a)CL ISL (Alow I1L
PL low + Ahi lTp Ihi).The expected costs of errors in the status quo can
be expressed as:
(1) ECsQ = A A,
+ hPNphi
lo FLPLow + AhNLLPhi
where A is a constant term equal to "cN4L
vL, representing the
relative expected cost of false no-liability findings to false liability
findings.
The first term in (1) is the expected cost of the false no-liability
findings and the second term is the expected cost of false liability
findings. For now, we focus on the benchmark case in which A = 1 (i.e.,
where the relative expected costs of false no-liability and false liability
findings are equal). In particular, this covers the situation in which
there are an equal number of truly liable and truly not liable cases,
and the cost of each type of erroneous finding is equal. Later we
discuss the importance of the value of A and the implications of
relaxing this assumption.
Suppose we observe neither the correct liability decision nor
whether the value of p is PL Ilow or PL hi (the court's likelihood of finding
liability, correctly or not) but instead observe a noisy signal s e [0,11
that contains information about p. For instance, this signal may be the
interest rate charged in a third-party financing arrangement. A higher
interest rate indicates a lower probability of a liability finding and
damage recovery. We imagine a claim-screening policy parameterized
by a pair of thresholds ti 5 t2. Under this policy, cases with s observed
below ti are automatically dismissed, those with s above t2 are
automatically found liable, and those with s between ti and t2 proceed
to trial as in the status quo.
In Lemma 1, we present necessary and sufficient conditions on
the conditional distributions of a noisy signal s such that a claimscreening policy will reduce error costs. To preview the results, a
signal reduces court error if and only if the signal has greater odds
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than the court of reaching the correct finding among the subset of
cases that are screened out. The conditions are equivalent to a
specification in our graphical illustrations above in that the height of
the benefits curve exceeds the costs curve, for some thresholds. Part (i)
of the claim applies to the lower tail of the signal distribution (cases
that are automatically dismissed) and (ii) applies to the upper tail
(cases that are found automatically liable). Part (iii) says that if each
tail taken alone has a cost-reducing claim-screening policy, then a
policy that screens out cases on both tails using each threshold does
even better. Here we present an intuitive statement of the lemma. The
formal statement and proof are presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: If (1) the relative costs of false liability and false noliability findings are equal, and (2) courts satisfy a minimal condition
of aggregate accuracy, namely, that courts are more likely than not to
find no liability in truly not liable cases and liability in truly liable
cases, the following hold:
(i) a beneficial pro-defendant claim-screening threshold exists if claim screening
overturns more status quo liability findings among low-probability cases (i.e., cases
more likely to have a correct outcome of not liable) than among high-probability cases
(i.e., cases more likely to have a correct outcome of liable).
(ii) a beneficial pro-plaintiff claim-screening threshold exists if claim screening
overturns more status quo no-liability findings among high-probability cases than
among low probability cases.
(iii) both pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff claim-screening thresholds are beneficial if
both (i) and (ii) hold.

The critical conditions (i) and (ii) are cost-benefit criteria.
Consider expression (4) in the Appendix. On the benefit side of the
ledger for pro-defendant claim screening are cases with low
probabilities of liability, because (2ow iL - A2owIE)PLIlowFNLIiow(t1) is
positive. This follows from the fact that truly not liable cases outweigh
truly liable cases among those with PLIlow (i.e., iow|iN >

iowir). This

benefit must be balanced against the expected cost from applying prodefendant claim screening to cases with a high probability of liability,
which sometimes also generate low signals and trigger automatic
dismissal. For this group there is a net cost because truly liable cases
outnumber truly not liable cases. Condition (i) says claim screening
overturns more status quo liability findings among low-probability
cases

(pL irowFNLiiow(ti))

than

among

high-probability

cases

If this is so, then the benefits of pro-defendant claim
screening exceed the costs.
The key question is when these conditions are met so that some
form of claim screening is appropriate. How likely are conditions (i)
and (ii) to be satisfied by some signal available to the court? We next
(pLlhFNLjhi(tl)).
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present a corollary to the preceding claim illustrating a general set of
signals satisfying these conditions. All that is required is that the
signals be sufficiently informative near the extremes of the
distribution.
The particular signal we consider is a weighted average of the
(unobserved) probability of a liability finding by the court (either PL Ilow
or PL hi in any given case) and a random variable r uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. As the weight on r approaches 1, the signal
approaches pure noise. We show that for any signal strength, there
are always thresholds at which claims should be screened. For any
positive value of the weight w on the true probability, no matter how
small, there will be some range of signal values at the extremes (i.e.,
near 0 and 1) which reveal the true underlying probability of liability
for the case at hand. Because we assume how Int > how IL, a minimum

requirement of aggregate judicial accuracy, screening out claims based
on such a signal will reduce the cost of errors. Here we provide an
intuitive statement of this claim and present the formal statement
and proof in the Appendix.
Claim 1: Consider any signal that is a weighted average of the
court's probability of finding liability and a pure statistical noise term.
Assume false liability findings and false no-liability findings are
equally costly. Then claim screening based on such a signal yields net
benefits.
Figure 3 graphically illustrates such a signal, for a value of w
such that some cases with intermediate signal values (between vi and
V2) proceed to trial. If we think of the signal value as the interest rate
on a third-party financing arrangement, a high interest rate would be
associated with a lower probability of a liability finding, hence a low
signal value. Under a claim-screening regime, interest rates above a
certain threshold would be automatically dismissed.
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Figure 3: Example of a Signal v Where Extreme Cases
Are Screened Out
F(v)
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.--..-..
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.........--.-

FN.Ihi (v)

FNLIlow (v)

0

6
WPLIIOw

WPLIhi
-Vl

Plow

Phi

WPLIlow+(l-w)

v

V2

Recall that A represents the relative importance of false noliability findings to false liability findings. The greater the value of A,
all else equal, the less likely we are to see net benefits from the
automatic dismissal of cases below a given threshold. At the same
time, greater values for A should increase the net benefit from finding
automatic liability above a given threshold. If the expected cost of
false liability increases relative to false no liability, we would need
more accurate signals as the basis upon which to dismiss claims
automatically. Likewise, we would tolerate less accurate signals upon
which to base automatic liability findings. We have already seen that
for A = 1, both pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff claim screening can
reduce costs relative to the status quo. In Claim 2, we use the specific
signal considered earlier to show that for any arbitrary value of A, at
least one of the two types of claim screening will always reduce error
costs relative to the status quo. Here we state Claim 2 intuitively and
present the formal statement and proof in the Appendix.
Claim 2: Consider any signal that is a weighted average of the
court's probability of finding liability and a pure statistical noise term.
Then for any relative weighting of the costs of false liability findings
and false no-liability findings, either pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff
claim screening (or both) reduces error costs relative to the status quo.
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C. A Model with Trial Costs
The analysis thus far has assumed zero court costs. In general,
the existence of court costs requires two modifications to our model.
First, court costs under the status quo can lead some cases at the
extremes-cases whose expected net benefits from going to trial are
negative-to be dropped. Second, error costs should be adjusted to
reflect the net difference between what defendants and plaintiffs
actually pay and receive, respectively, and what they should optimally
pay and receive. For instance, some of the error associated with
finding a defendant falsely not liable may be offset if the defendant
still has to pay substantial court costs.
The result of the first effect, other things being equal, is to
reduce the potential savings from any given claim-screening policy.
This is because as court costs increase, more cases at the extremes
would be dropped anyway under the status quo. Indeed, in the
extreme case where costs are so high that no cases go to court in the
status quo, all cases would be dropped or settled in favor of the likely
winner, and claim screening would offer no additional benefit. In a
sense, increasing litigation costs when an objective signal of the
likelihood of liability is available is an indirect way of screening
claims. Deriving conditions under which a beneficial claim-screening
policy exists requires taking this effect into account. Rather than
repeating the exercise of Lemma 1 for the case of nonzero court costs,
in this Section we assume such a policy exists and study how its
thresholds might change in response to changes in court costs. We will
show that the optimal thresholds increase in response to higher court
costs, and that the first effect of higher court costs (more cases
dropped in the status quo) is irrelevant to this response. The more
cases that are dropped in the status quo due to higher court costs, the
less claim screening reduces errors relative to the status quo. Of
course, more cases dropped in the status quo may mean that the
amount by which claim screening reduces errors (relative to the status
quo) may decrease when court costs are higher.
Assume for simplicity that each party incurs fixed court costs K
in the event of a trial. The total cost associated with erroneous
liability and no-liability findings are cLisz and cNLIE (as before).
However, we must now interpret these costs more specifically. In a
truly not liable case, we assume the optimal outcome is for the
defendant to pay nothing and the plaintiff to receive nothing.
Similarly, in a truly liable case, the defendant should pay D and the
plaintiff should receive D. To measure the error cost associated with
any given pair of payments, we add the plaintiffs and the defendant's
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absolute deviations from their optimal payments.1 7 For instance, in a
truly not liable case that goes to court and is incorrectly found liable,
the defendant pays D + K and the plaintiff receives D - K. The optimal
payments to/from each party in this case are zero, so (because we have
assumed D > K) the total deviation from the optimum is 2D. As
another example, court costs can introduce errors even in cases that
are decided correctly. If a truly not liable case is correctly found not
liable at court, both the defendant and plaintiff still pay K, resulting
in a total deviation of 2K from the optimal payments. To preserve
comparison with the case of zero court costs, we define cLImR and cNLIE
as the costs of deviations of magnitude 2D in truly not liable and truly
liable cases, respectively. Accordingly, errors for other outcomes can
be expressed (in proportion with their magnitudes) in terms of CLINL
and cNL I_.
Table 2 summarizes the total errors associated with different
findings in each type of case. Note that the errors for cases with
incorrect findings are independent of court costs, because court costs
reduce the error for one party by exactly the same amount they
increase it for the other party. Court costs matter only for cases with
correct findings. In these cases, court costs increase overall error costs
by distorting the payments of both parties away from their optimal
levels.

Table 2: Error Costs of Outcomes in the Presence of Court
Costs K Per Party
Finding type

Correct

Liability finding

No-liability finding

Truly liable

cNLIrK/D

CNLIL

Truly not liable

CL Nl

CL insz KID

outcome

type

17. The optimal amounts a defendant should pay and a plaintiff should receive would
generally flow from a larger model focusing on some specific litigation context, such as
minimizing the overall costs of accidents, and need not be equal in magnitude. To simplify the
discussion, we have assumed equal penalties for deviations from what the defendant should pay
and deviations from what the plaintiff should receive.
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As before, given each (unobserved) potential probability of
liability p e {PLIow, PLIhi}, we have a signal s of the underlying
probability of liability, with cumulative distribution FNL Jp(S). We
assume that the plaintiff, defendant, and court share the same signal.
(We leave the case of asymmetric information to the simulation model
in the next part.) A plaintiff will drop any suit for which the expected
gain from going to trial (the expected probability of winning, based on
signal s, times the damage amount) is less than the court costs. More
formally, a plaintiff will drop any suit for which the signal s is such
that E(p Is) < KID. The signal is useful to the parties, even in the
status quo, because they are able to update the probability that the
court will find liability to the appropriate value between PL Ilow and
PL hi. A defendant will pay full damages for any signal s such that
E(p Is) > (1 - KID).18 When the parties observe a signal value s (for
instance, an interest rate on a third-party financing arrangement),
they can calculate the implied probability of a court finding liability.
To simplify notation, we therefore normalize realizations of the signal
s to equal the expectation of p that they imply. Therefore PL IIO, < S <
PLIhi .

We will analyze nontrivial claim-screening policies given by
(tl*,

t2*)

satisfying KID < ti*

< t2*

< (1 - KID). These policies are

nontrivial because they screen out some cases that would not have
been dropped anyway in the status quo. To simplify later notation, let
Ziow and Zhi represent error costs in correctly adjudicated cases when
the probability of liability is PL ow and PL hi, respectively. Recall that A
is a constant term equal to

"NLL(1 a'cLiL, representing the relative

expected cost of false no-liability findings to false liability findings. To
simplify notation, we express Ziow and Zhi as a function of A, rather
than the underlying cost terms described in Table 2.
(7a) ZiOw

(7b)

=

Zhi =

AAL,,ppow

tNPN4low)

K (AAhg Lhi + Ah(LPNqhJ

Let ECcs(ti*, t2*, K) be the expected error costs of a claimscreening policy with thresholds (tl*, t2*), when court costs at trial are
K per party.

18. Note that we assume that litigation in the status quo will involve only positiveexpected-value suits. The results, however, would be strengthened if we allowed for negativeexpected-value suits in the status quo because some of these suits would result in automatic
findings of no liability.
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*))+ZhiI(jhi

The presence of court costs adds errors only for the subset of
cases going to trial (the terms with Z). Even when the court reaches
the correct decision in the status quo, court costs distort the payments
of each party away from their optimal values. By eliminating this
small distortion of optimal payments in correctly decided cases, claim
screening generates an additional benefit relative to the situation in
which court costs are zero. The next claim shows that the optimal
claim-screening thresholds, if they exist between KID and (1 - KID),
move closer together when court costs increase. Once again, we
provide an intuitive statement here and reserve the formal statement
and proof for the Appendix.
Claim 3: Assume we have an optimal claim-screening policy
characterized by thresholds tl* and t2*. Then any increase in court
costs implies that the optimal thresholds should move closer together
(i.e., more cases should be automatically decided rather than going to
court).
Higher court costs increase the expected error costs of cases
going to trial without affecting the error costs of those that are
screened out. On the margin, it therefore becomes worthwhile to
screen out more cases.
To summarize our results in this Section, we have shown that a
third-party signal, even if statistically noisy, can reduce the overall
costs of false liability and no-liability findings, so long as (1) judges in
the aggregate are more likely than not to reach the correct decision
and (2) the signal is a minimally informative statistical predictor of
aggregate judicial opinion. A claim-screening mechanism based on
such a signal would automatically dismiss cases with signals
indicating a very low probability of liability, find automatic liability in
cases with signals indicating a very high probability of liability, and
allow to proceed to trial those cases with intermediate signals. We
have also shown how such claim-screening policies could be adjusted
to account for variations in court costs, as well as variations in the
relative weighting of the costs of false liability and false no-liability
findings.
We have abstracted away somewhat from the settlementbargaining process, though incorporating it more explicitly would not
affect the main results. To see how claim screening would adjust to
the settlement-bargaining process, consider the following example for
a court with a 5% error rate. In the status quo, if we assume that all
cases settle for their expected value at court, all the truly liable cases
will settle for 95% of full damages and all the truly not liable cases
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will settle for 5% of full damages. If we measure error as the deviation
between what is actually paid and what should be paid (i.e., full
damages in truly liable cases and no damages in truly not liable
cases), this means a 5% error in every case, the same overall error rate
that we obtain in the no-settlement model. Introducing settlement
aggregates idiosyncratic court error and spreads it evenly across all
cases but does not reduce it. We still need a claim-screening
mechanism to eliminate the idiosyncratic errors. Nonetheless, it may
be useful to incorporate settlement and other features directly into the
model, both to assess what claim-screening thresholds might be
plausible and to explore tentatively the robustness of our conclusions.
We now turn to that task.
III. SIMULATION MODEL

Our mathematical model is quite general, showing that there
are some signals that should trigger claim screening without
specifying what those signals should be. To obtain a better sense of the
numbers, we need a more complicated model that incorporates
settlement. Such a model is not likely to be mathematically tractable,
however, so we turn to simulation. The heart of the simulation is a
simple, general litigation model involving a plaintiff and a defendant.
To calculate each data point on the graphs in the following analysis,
the computer played this litigation game 50,000 times. In its most
basic form (we will consider some variations later), the game works as
follows: The plaintiff sues the defendant for damages D, which are
assumed to be agreed upon in advance (for simplicity). The actual
probability that the plaintiff will eventually win the lawsuit, p, is
drawn from a uniform distribution from 0 to 1. The plaintiff,
defendant, and a third party each independently estimate this
probability without bias but with noise, producing estimates pp, PD,
and PT. The degree of noise depends on the value of noise coefficients
nP, fD, and nT, respectively.19

The plaintiff and defendant each calculate the expected value
of trial based on their respective estimates, EVE and EVD, taking into
account both the cost of litigation (KP and KD) and the claim-screening
legal regime. (In the ordinary case, EVP > 0 and EVD < 0.) The case
19. Each estimate pi = f(p + N(nm)), where N outputs a random number drawn from a normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation ni, and fx) is a function that calculates the
expected value of p for any estimate x biased by adding a random normal deviate, given the
initial distribution of cases and the particular value of ni. We calculated f(x) using Monte Carlo
techniques. While it is not necessarily the case that 0 < p + N(ni) < 1, it will always be the case
that 0 < pi < 1. Note that as ni increases, pi will approach 0.50.
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will have a settlement range if EVE + EVD < 0. When this is so, the
case will settle at the midpoint of the settlement range. When it is not,
then either party may still choose to default; P will default (i.e., drop
the case) if EVr < 0, and D will default (i.e., accept an adverse
judgment) if -EVD > D. If neither party defaults, the case goes to trial.
A random number r is generated from a uniform distribution from 0 to
1, and the plaintiff wins the lawsuit if p > r. If the plaintiff wins, the
defendant pays the plaintiff D.
A disadvantage of simulation models is that particular values
have to be chosen for the relevant parameters, and simulation models
can provide no assurance about generalizability of the results for
combinations of parameter values not selected. Nonetheless,
simulation models make it relatively easy to examine the
consequences of changing both the parameter values and the structure
of the simulation itself. We thus assigned baseline values for the
parameters, admittedly with some arbitrariness, and later we will
consider the effects of changing some of these baseline values. In all
subsequent simulations, these baseline values are used unless
otherwise indicated. In particular, we assumed that D = 100 and that
Kr= KD = 15.20 In addition, the baseline simulation set nP = fD = 0.15,
and nT= 0.25. These noise coefficients correspond to an average
absolute error in estimating p of about 0.1 for both the plaintiff and
defendant, and 0.15 for the third party. Whether our estimate of nT is
plausible depends on the technology used to induce third-party
estimates, but we believe that this estimate is quite conservative.
Note that if p = 0.50, then an estimate randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution between 0.20 and 0.80 would also produce an
average absolute error of 0.15.
To measure the effectiveness of the legal system with and
without claim screening, we calculated average overdeterrence errors
and average underdeterrence errors. When a defendant pays money
even though the correct answer would require the defendant to pay
nothing, the defendant is overdeterred and presumably takes
excessive precautions. In such a case, the net amount of money spent
by the defendant counts as the overdeterrence error. When a

20. We recognize that some empirical studies support a value closer to 25. See Donohue,
supra note 13, at 201 n.25. We chose a value of 15 largely because with a value of 25, the rate of
settlement is approximately 0.99 or higher for many of the cases considered, making
comparisons less interesting. Using a value of 25 would produce an unrealistically high
settlement rate on this model because of the assumption that the decision to go to trial is made
once and forever at the outset of litigation. If Donohue's 25 includes costs that are sunk before a
commitment to going to trial, we could reconcile the two figures by interpreting 15 as only those
costs incurred after the decision to go to trial is made.
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defendant pays less than full damages in a case in which the correct
answer is to pay full damages, the defendant is underdeterred. In such
a case, the amount by which the defendant's payments fall short of full
damages counts as the underdeterrence error. Our measures of the
defendant's payments include trial costs. So, for example, if a trial in
which the defendant should be found liable results in the defendant
paying $100 in damages, but also $15 for the defendant's legal
expenses, the case counts as producing $15 in overdeterrence error
and $0 in underdeterrence error. In no single case will there be both
overdeterrence and underdeterrence errors. Note that damages can be
expressed in terms of over- or undercompensation errors, but using
the deterrence framework is straightforward.
Calculating the errors requires an assumption about what
answer is correct in a particular case. Our baseline assumption is that
the probability that a position is correct is equal to the proportion of
decisionmakers who would adopt that position. Thus, when the
random number generator draws p = 0.25 from a uniform distribution,
there is a 0.25 probability that the plaintiff should win and a 0.75
probability that the defendant should win. The simulation thus
performs an additional random number generation to choose between
these possibilities. Thus, 75% of the time, the simulation will assume
that the correct legal answer is for the defendant to win and pay
nothing, and 25% of the time, the simulation will assume that the
correct answer is for the plaintiff to win and receive D from the
defendant. We will, however, relax this assumption later, considering
both the possibility that majorities are disproportionately correct (so
that when 90% of judges would rule for D, there is greater than a 0.9
probability that this is the correct answer) and the possibility that
majorities are not quite proportionately correct (so that when 90% of
judges would rule for D, there is less than a 0.90 probability that this
is the correct answer).
For most of the simulations reported here, the results for
overdeterrence error and underdeterrence error were qualitatively
similar, although overdeterrence error was systematically somewhat
higher as a result of legal fees. We thus simply report the sum of these
measures, 21 denoted "error costs," recognizing that in some legal

21. The sum, not the difference, is the appropriate measure. Underdeterrence and
overdeterrence costs do not cancel out because the costs occur in different cases. Consider a tort
system that imposed no damages on a defendant in a case in which the defendant should have
taken a precaution and then imposed damages on a defendant in a case in which the defendant
should not have taken and did not take a precaution. This legal system will not produce
appropriate incentives to take precautions, regardless of whether the defendant in the two cases
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contexts, the welfare consequences of a marginal dollar in
overdeterrence may differ from the consequences of a marginal dollar
in underdeterrence. This measure provides a proxy for the overall
inaccuracy of the legal system. The measure is not, however, a general
measure of the total welfare consequences of the legal system, which
also depend on the trial costs. Although trial costs may affect
deterrence error-for example, by increasing the extent of
overdeterrence-they also have direct welfare consequences.

A. Change in Signal Strength
We begin by considering how claim screening affects error costs
in the baseline case and when the third party receives two signals of
variant strengths. The two alternative values for nr are 0.15 (a
relatively strong signal providing the third party a forecasting ability
equal to that of each of the parties) and 0.35 (a very weak signal). For
each of the signals, we consider different thresholds beyond which the
plaintiff and the defendant would automatically win. We use
symmetrical thresholds, such as 0.10 for pro-defendant claim
screening and 0.90 for pro-plaintiff claim screening. A threshold of 0
for the plaintiff and 1 for the defendant is equivalent to a regime of no
claim screening, and a threshold of 0.50 for each party is equivalent to
a regime in which all claims are resolved on the basis of the thirdparty estimate. We assume in these simulations that the claim
screening takes place before any settlement negotiations. 22
Figure 4 illustrates the results. The x-axis reports the
threshold for determining whether the plaintiff automatically wins; in
all simulations, the corresponding threshold for whether the
defendant automatically wins was equal to (1 - "plaintiff threshold").
Unsurprisingly, error is lower with the stronger signal. More
surprisingly, the analysis suggests that the optimal thresholds are
relatively close to 0.50-that is, a relatively large number of cases
should be automatically screened to minimize the absolute error.
Optimal thresholds fall between (0.50, 0.50) and (0.40, 0.60) for both
happens to be the same party. The party will have an incentive to take an inefficient precaution
and not to take an efficient one.
22. Had we not adopted this assumption, the simulation would have required an initial round
of settlement negotiations in which each party estimates the probability that the third party will
announce a value above or below the threshold. We anticipate that social welfare results would
be similar, though not quite as dramatic, in a regime in which settlement could occur before
claim screening. Litigants would recognize that relatively frivolous claims would very likely be
dismissed even before trial, thus dramatically reducing the danger of an idiosyncratic
decisionmaker at trial, but defendants might still agree to very low settlements for lowprobability claims.
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Figure 5: Effect of Party Signal Strength
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simulation model seems to indicate that with an unbiased signal,
claim screening may be optimally beneficial for cases with
probabilities of victory roughly below 0.40 or above 0.60. In the context
of litigation finance, this suggests that the plaintiff should be allowed
to seek third-party financing only if the financing company agrees to
offer fee shifting at a level that would lead the financing company to
screen out cases where it believes that the plaintiff has less than a
0.40 probability of winning.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine just what the
optimal fee-shifting level is, but a basic regime in which the fees are
shifted seems unlikely to screen claims in which the plaintiff has a
higher probability of winning than that. Even with fee shifting, many
cases will settle. Assuming that only 80% of cases settle, if the
plaintiff prevails in 40% of the remaining 20% of cases (thus, 8%), the
expected cost of fee shifting would be only approximately 4% of legal
fees (12% - 8%), and this assumes further that the other party agrees
to the offer of fee shifting. As long as the average interest payment
from the plaintiff exceeds this level in the remaining 80% of cases, the
investment is still a beneficial one. It thus seems likely that a
requirement forcing a litigation finance company to agree to fee
shifting would produce a relatively small amount of claim screening,
less than would be socially optimal. Thus, such a requirement would
likely increase welfare relative to a regime in which litigation finance
is offered without restriction. Over time, more dramatic screening
mechanisms, such as double fee shifting, might be employed.
Our analysis also suggests that claim screening might be used
in other cases, even if the mechanism is costly. Although we recognize
that claim screening is a more radical change to the legal process than
mere regulation of litigation finance, which would likely encounter
due process and other objections, our analysis suggests that it could be
beneficial. One possible approach would be to require all parties to
obtain litigation finance in a way that ensures that the party's chance
of prevailing exceeds some threshold. While it seems unlikely that
such a requirement would be grafted onto the legal system, one can
imagine more incremental change, first by regulating litigation
finance and later by requiring litigation finance in cases in which
there is reason to suspect that the plaintiffs case is weak.
Judges already make preliminary assessments under existing
claim-screening mechanisms, such as the dismissal of a case for
failure to state a claim 23 and issuance of summary judgment. 24 In
23. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
24. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
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theory, these mechanisms are not explicitly probabilistic in nature.
They generally ask whether the plaintiff would prevail if the facts are
as claimed and whether there is a "genuine issue as to any material
fact." The summary judgment standard has long been seen as only
requiring parties to meet their burdens of production. 25 Recent
Supreme Court cases have given judges more flexibility to dismiss
cases that they view as relatively unlikely to prevail. 26 Thus, in
practice, judges may sometimes dismiss or issue summary judgment
in cases where the evidence on a dispositive issue is extremely onesided. To the extent this is so, our model may approximate existing
practices. Moreover, our model suggests a potential compromise
between those who believe that giving judges more flexibility to grant
summary judgment is beneficial and those who believe that judges are
poorly equipped to make probabilistic judgments of this sort. Judges
could be given great flexibility to dismiss cases on summary judgment,
but parties whose cases are dismissed would subsequently have the
opportunity to obtain litigation financing under a contract if terms
imply a reasonable chance of victory. Thus, litigation finance would be
required only in cases in which a judge doubted a party's case. Our
purpose has not been to identify precisely the situations in which
litigation finance would be required, or in which preexisting litigation
finance contracts would be used to determine whether claims should
be screened. But our analysis has shown that claim screening based
on a signal might be beneficial, and litigation finance agreements,
voluntary or not, are a possible source of information on claim
strength.

25. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (elaborating on the burdenshifting framework).
26. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (detailing a court's authority to dismiss a
complaint that offers only conclusions and finding that pleadings require more than a "thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545
(2007) (holding that a complaint requires some factual matter, whereas a bare assertion of
conspiracy is insufficient to meet the pleading standard).
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V. APPENDIX

In this appendix we present the formal statements and proofs
of the claims in the mathematical section of the paper.
wio.I
n be the proportion of
Lemma 1: Let A = 1. Let ow Ir and
truly liable and not liable cases, respectively, that have a PLIow
probability of a liability finding at court. The remaining cases in each
group have a PLIhi probability of a liability finding at court. Assume
2
lowiR > Aowir. Let s e [0,1] be a signal of a court's (unobserved)
probability of finding liability in a given case p E {pLIlow, PLIhi}. Assume
this signal has cumulative conditional distribution functions
F(s Ipi), i E {L Ilow,L Ihi}.
To
simplify
notation,
denote
F(s IpL low) = FNLitow(s)

Define

F(s IpLIhi) = FNL hi(S).

and

FL Ilow(s) = 1- FNL Ilow(s) and FL Ihi(S) =1

-

FNL Ihi(S).

Denote the total

error cost of a claim-screening policy with lower threshold ti and upper
threshold t2 as ECs(tl,t2) with 0 < ti < t2 < L, According to such a
policy, cases with s < ti are automatically dismissed, those with s > t2
are automatically liable, and those with t1 5 s 5 t2 are adjudicated as in
the status quo. Consider the following conditions:
(2a) There exists 0 < 8i such that
PL IlowFNL Ilow(S1) > PL IhiFNL Ihi(S1)
(2b) There exists S2 < 1 such that
PNL IlowFL Ilow(S2) < PNL IhiFL Ihi(S2)

Then:
(i) a claim-screening policy (ti*,1) exists such that ECcs(t*, 1) < ECsQ if and only if (2a)
holds
(ii) a claim-screening policy (0, t2*) exists such that ECcs(O, t*) < ECsQ if and only if
(2b) holds
(iii) for any policies in (i) and (ii) such that 0 < ti* < ts* < 1, the combined policy (tl*,
t2*)

satisfies ECcs (ti*, 12*) < ECcs (0,

t2*)

and ECcs (ti*,

t2*)

< ECcs (t1*, 1)

Proof: Under a given claim-screening policy (ti,
error costs from incorrect findings are:
(3)

ECcs

(

= FpLow(tI)Atl

+FNL~hi 1

~%LIo

h~)

+ (A,,izPNLIIW+Alow
oPlow(FNLV.ow (t2)

-

(2 ) lo

t2),

expected

4+F,(1z2Aq

Fatew (t.))+ (AhaLPNLh

2

+ A4LPLIhAi

FSi (t 2)

-FNLhi

(1))

The first term in (3) represents false, automatic no-liability findings,
the second term represents false, automatic liability findings, the
third term represents mistakes at trial for low-probability-of-liability
cases, and the fourth term represents mistakes at trial for highprobability-of-liability cases. To show (i), note that the difference in
error costs ECsQ - ECcs(ti, 1) can be expressed as:
(4)

L

-l

l

FNLIlo(tz)PLIow -

FNLhi @1 )PLhi)
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Condition (2a) implies that this expression is positive for some
si= ti. To establish the existence of a claim-screening policy, let
ti* = si. Now suppose we have such a cost-reducing claim-screening

policy. This means (4) is positive for ti = tl*. Then letting si = t1*

establishes (2a). The proof for (ii) is similar and is omitted. Finally, to
show (iii), note that ECsQ - ECcs(ti*,1) = ECcs(0, t2*) - ECcs(ti*, t2*)
and ECsQ- ECcs(O, t2*) = ECcs(ti*,1) - ECcs(ti*, t2*).E
Claim 1: Define the signal v = wp + (1 - w)r, where p e {pLIlow,
PL Ihi}, w is an arbitrary weighting parameter satisfying 0 < w < 1, and

r is a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then any such
signal satisfies conditions (2a) and (2b) of Lemma 1, and there exist
thresholds for which claim screening reduces costs relative to the
status quo.
Proof: Because r is uniformly distributed on [0,1], v, itself a
function of r, is also a random variable uniformly distributed on [wp,
wp + (1 - w)]. Letting p equal each of its two possible values (pL Ilow and

we can express the two conditional cumulative (uniform)
distribution functions for v as FN IIow(v) = (v - WPLIlow) / (1-w) for v

PL hi)

e[wpLlow, WPLIlow+ (1 - w)], and FNLIhi(v)

=

(v

-

WpLjhi) /(1-

w) where

v e[WpLIhi, WpLhi+(1-w)].

Assume without loss of generality that the two conditional
CDFs overlap, so that WPLIhi < [wpLIlow + (1 - w)]. Define the claimscreening thresholds as (vi, V2) = (WpLjhi, [WPLIIow + (1 - w)]). We have
chosen the lower threshold so that any realization v < vi implies the
true probability is PLIlow. Automatically dismissing all such cases
would reduce the error cost by PL Ilow for each truly not liable case but
increase the error cost by pLIlow for each truly liable case, relative to
the status quo. However, the not liable cases outnumber the liable
cases among cases with p =PLIlow (recall that we assumed A= 1 and
2

how INL >

2

iow IL), so the net result is a reduction in error costs from

claim screening on very low signals. Likewise, when we observe
signals greater than V2, we know they could have arisen only if the
case had a probability of liability p =pLhi. By parallel reasoning,
finding automatic liability among these cases reduces error costs
relative to the status quo. Thus, because claim screening improves
outcomes relative to the status quo for ranges of the signal near 0 and
1 and does not change the outcomes for all other intermediate values
of the signals (where cases proceed to trial), error costs are lower
under this claim-screening policy than under the status quo. .
Claim 2: As before, define the signal v = wp + (1 - w)r, where p

e {PLIlow, pLIhi}, w is an arbitrary weighting parameter satisfying 0 < w
< 1, and r is a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then,
for any value of A, (2a) or (2b) (or both) are satisfied. Consequently,
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either pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff claim screening (or both) reduces
error costs relative to the status quo.
Proof: As in Claim 1, define the claim-screening thresholds as
(1 - W)]). Incorporating A into the
[WPLIIow +
(V1,V2) = (WPLIhi,
expression, we now write the difference in error costs from prodefendant claim screening ECsQ - ECcs (vi, 1) as:
(5) ( IN

-

AAol

)NLVlwI

)PLIlow

A@4 )FNLjhi V1 )PLhi

h+NL -

Note that when A = 1, this condition reduces to (4), because
= 0. The difference in error costs from pro-plaintiff claim
screening ECsQ - ECcs (0, v2) is:

FNL Ihi(Vi)

(6)

(AAto0 Z -l

L|)JLOI2)pNLlow

+ (AAp

-

AhNL

)FLhi (V2)PNLhi

We wish to show that at least one of the two preceding
expressions is positive, for any value of A. Under the chosen claim
screening thresholds, we have FLIow(V2) =FNLli(vi) = 0. For the first
expression to be positive, we must have Aiowlst > AAiowi. For the
second to be positive, we need Ahilst <AAhilr. Because hlowinI > Aiowir,
the first expression is positive for A < Alow IA/howI L= Al. The second
expression is positive for A > Xhi ILn Ahilt = A2. Because Alow INL > AlowI E,

Al > 1 and A2 < 1. Thus for A < A 2 , only pro-defendant claim screening
reduces cost, for A > Al only pro-plaintiff claim screening reduces cost
and for A2 < A < Al, both reduce cost. m
Claim 3: Assume we have a signal s with twice-differentiable
conditional distributions FNLilow(s) and FNLIhi(S). Let their respective
probability density functions be fNL Ilow(s) and fNL Ihi(S). Assume we have
an optimal (cost-minimizing) claim-screening policy (tl*, t2*) satisfying
KID < ti* < t2* < (1-KID). Also assume that the second-order
condition for a minimum is satisfied at ti* and t2*, namely that
d 2ECcsldti2 > 0 and d 2ECcs/dt22 > 0. Then an increase in court costs
implies an increase in ti* and a decrease in t2*.
Proof : A necessary condition of the optimal claim-screening
policy (ti*, t2*) is that the first-order conditions with respect to each
threshold are zero when evaluated at (ti*, t2*). Define Gi(ti*,K) and
G2(2*,K) as:
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(9)G,(t',K)=
at,
I

(10)G 2(t,K)= aECCS
2 at2

= aE1c(tt;,0)
((NLI1o'
-o(t)Z
(t1 )low
ati

(4,t

aECcs(t ,t ,o)

+ (fNLIoW(t;
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+/L
+hALI

)Zow

hi(tI)

=

+fNLhi(t)Zhi)= 0

Implicitly differentiating Gi(ti*,K) and G2(t2*,K) and using the secondorder condition yields the desired results: dti*/dK > 0 and dt2*/dK <
0. M

To gain some intuition on this result, consider equation (9). A
small increase in the threshold for automatically dismissing cases
means more cases will be dismissed. The first term in the three-term
expression in equation (9) reflects the change in costs associated with
an increased number of correctly and incorrectly overturned liability
findings. This term is independent of court costs. The last two terms
represent the additional benefits attributable to distorted payments in
the presence of court costs among cases going to court. The existence
of these additional benefits always means more cases should be
screened out when court costs increase. The interpretation of equation
(10) for the upper threshold is analogous.

